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CRIMINAL LAW-Entrapment Defense-Jury Entitled To
Disbelieve a Defendant's Unrebutted Testimony Concerning
Entrapment. United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 277 (1977).
Special Agent William Lukowski of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms, arrested Jonathan Townsend in November,
1974, and charged him with knowing and unlawful possession of two
firearms.' At defendant Townsend's subsequent trial, Special Agent
James Warren of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation testified that
he visited informant Ulysees "Ted" Core on January 24, 1974.2 War-
ren stated that Core subsequently admitted Townsend who lived in
the adjoining apartment.' During a discussion about firearms,
Townsend offered a sawed-off shotgun for sale.4 Warren related that
both Core and Townsend then left the apartment to retrieve the
firearm and that when they returned, Core was carrying the gun.5
The agent testified that Townsend requested eighty dollars for the
weapon, and a sale took place.' Agent Warren added that a second
sale took place six days later.7
The prosecution did not charge Townsend with the illegal trans-
fers of the firearms, but with possession of the weapons prior to the
sales.' The defense admitted the unlawful possession, but claimed
1. United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 277
(1977). The defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm without regis-
tration in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(c) and 5861(d) (1970), and two counts of knowing
possession of a firearm without payment of the making tax as required by 26 U.S.C. §§
5821(a) and 5861(c). Two additional counts charging knowing transfer of a firearm without
payment of the making tax were dismissed on the defendant's motion before trial. 555 F.2d
at 153 n.1.
2. Id. at 154. Special Agent Robert Biby of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation later
testified that informer Core was probably paid one hundred dollars for his work in each of
the sales. He added that although the Illinois Bureau had no charges pending against Core,
other organizations did. The agent acknowledged that the Bureau would assist Core with
regard to these charges because of his cooperation. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The United States Code defines and regulates "firearms". For convenience, the
terms "firearms", "weapons", and "guns" will be used interchangeably.
6. Id.
7. Id. The price of the second firearm purchased by Warren was ninety dollars. Id. (Swy-
gert, J., dissenting). The dissent adds that Core was present at the second sale. Id. at 159.
8. Special Agent William Lukowski, who arrested the defendant, testified that neither of
the firearms were registered with the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
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that informer Core entrapped Townsend into possessing the fire-
arms.
On cross-examination, Agent Warren admitted that he visited
Core's apartment on the days of the sales with the intention of
purchasing a shotgun from the defendant. 0 He also conceded that
Townsend refused to accept payments directly from him, but re-
quired him to hand the money to Core, who then handed it to
Townsend."
To show the circumstances of his alleged entrapment, defendant
Townsend testified at the trial. He recounted that he had known
Core for eleven years and that Core, relying on their friendship,
asked him to take possession of the firearms because he was having
problems with his "old lady". 2 The defendant stated that prior to
the first sale, Core had told him the price to ask for the gun, and
that both men had previously discussed the selling price of the
second firearm purchased by Agent Warren. 3
On cross-examination, Townsend admitted receiving about sixty-
five dollars from the sales. 4 He also conceded that he had been
involved with firearms all of his life, and that he had prior convic-
tions for armed robbery and burglary.'"
The defendant's motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence
was denied." The jury rejected the entrapment claim and found
Id. at 154. The parties stipulated that both firearms involved were manufactured without
payment of the making tax. Id. at 154 n.2.
9. Id. at 155. A defendant who claims entrapment must admit to committing the offense
charged. United States v. Pickle, 424 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1970); Sylvia v. United States, 312
F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); United States v. Carter, 326 F.2d
351, 353 (7th Cir. 1963); Ware v. United States, 259 F.2d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1958); Eastman
v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954).
10. 555 F.2d at 154.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 155. The defendant stated that he had heard rumors that Core was an informant
for the Illinois Bureau, but that Core had specifically denied this. Id.
13. Id.
14. Defendant Townsend admitted receiving forty dollars from the first sale and twenty-
five or thirty dollars from the second sale. He claimed that Core had previously owed him
forty dollars. Townsend also testified that he did not receive any money from Core until they
had both returned to the defendant's apartment. Id.
15. Id. The defendant further admitted holding the first shotgun sold to Agent Warren
for two or three days prior to the sale, knowing that it was a sawed-off shotgun. He also
admitted holding the second shotgun for twenty-three or twenty-four hours prior to the second
sale. Id.
16. Id.
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Townsend guilty of knowing and unlawful possession of the fire-
arms. '7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury's
verdict.' The issue contested on appeal was whether the Govern-
ment satisfied its burden of proving Townsend guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Although neither side had called the informer to
testify at the trial," the majority held that the testimony of agents
Warren and Lukowski, along with Townsend's own admissions, was
sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt to uphold the jury's find-
ings. 10 It also suggested that the Government did not have the bur-
den of rebutting the defendant's testimony concerning his alleged
entrapment.2 The majority stated that the jury could have disbe-
lieved the defendant's testimony and convicted him solely on its
view of his credibility.22
Judge Luther Swygert, in his dissent, argued that the Govern-
ment must rebut the defendant's testimony concerning entrap-
ment.2" He noted that the defendant's predisposition, or initial will-
ingness to commit the offense charged, is the central issue in entrap-
ment cases.2" Judge Swygert concluded that the Government could
not prove Townsend guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without the
testimony of informer Core concerning the defendant's initial solici-
tation."2
17. Id. With regard to the first firearm which the defendant had in his possession, he
received five-year concurrent imprisonment sentences. For possession of the second firearm,
the defendant was placed on five years' probation to be served consecutively to his imprison-
ment sentence. Id. at. 153.
18. Id. at 159.
19. Id. at 155.
20. Id. at 158.
21. Id. at 155-56.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Id. at 165.
24. Id. at 161. This was first indicated by the Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932). The Court stated that the government could legitimately provide an
opportunity for the commission of a crime, but held that entrapment was a valid defense
where a person otherwise innocent was induced by the government to commit the offense.
Id. at 451. This position was affirmed in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 359 (1958), in
which Chief Justice Warren stated that in determining whether entrapment occurred, "a line
must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal." Id. at-372.
25. 555 F.2d at 165. The dissent stated: "[ilt was the Government's duty to call Core as
its rebuttal witness if it was to raise the issue of predisposition to one of credibility sufficient
to go to the jury to decide whether it had discharged its burden of proof." Id.
1978]
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Where a defendant claims entrapment, the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to commit
the offense.26 Under the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Hampton v. United States, 7 the defense of entrapment is unavaila-
ble regardless of the degree of government misconduct if the predis-
position of the defendant is established."
While predisposition is the central issue in entrapment cases,
there is much confusion over the burden of proof placed on the
respective parties. At one time, a defendant had the burden of prov-
ing his claim of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence."
However, the courts' instructions to the jury on the Government's
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the defendant's burden of proving entrapment by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, resulted in confusion for both the trial judge °
and the jury.' To remedy this situation, the courts have imposed a
much lighter burden on the defendant-that of going forward with
the evidence in support of his claim of entrapment.32 Once a defen-
dant has satisfied his burden, the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that government agents did not entrap the de-
fendant.3
The evidence sufficient to meet this burden has been the subject
of much litigation,34 centering around the Supreme Court's holding
26. United v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421"U.S. 949 (1975);
United States v. Conversano, 412 F.2d 1143, 1149 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969);
Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806, 809 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d
425 (7th Cir. 1958).
27. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
28. Id. at 490.
29. Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963). The
Gorin court stated:
Since by the defense the accused is asking to be relieved of the consequences of his
guilt, if found or admitted, by objecting to the tactics of the representatives of the
government, we think that one who raises the defense should be required not only to
come forward with evidence but should also be required to establish inducement by a
preponderance of the evidence.
313 F.2d at 654.
30. United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1965).
31. Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 796 n.3. (Ist Cir. 1965).
32. Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 203 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816
(1966).
33. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
34. See, e.g., Estrella-Ortega v. United States, 423 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Draper, 411 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 906 (1970); United States v.
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in Masciale v. United States.35 In that case, defendant Frank Mas-
ciale appealed from a Second Circuit decision" affirming his convic-
tion of selling narcotics.37 He claimed that an informer named
Kowel, using the lure of easy income, entrapped him into arranging
the sales. The facts showed that Kowel had introduced Masciale to
Agent Marshall, who posed as a narcotics buyer.3" Marshall and
Masciale then arranged the narcotics sale that was the basis of the
conviction. 9 At the trial, Marshall testified that upon first meeting
Masciale, the defendant had boasted that he knew someone who
was influential in the narcotics field from whom Marshall could
obtain "88 per cent pure heroin."40 In his defense, Masciale alleged
that he spoke with Marshall to assist Kowel in making an impres-
sion on Marshall. 41
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's submission of the
entrapment issue to the jury, stating that Masciale had not estab-
lished entrapment as a matter of law. 42 In so holding, the Court
stated: "While petitioner [Masciale] presented enough evidence
for the jury to consider, they were entitled to disbelieve him in
regard to Kowel and so find for the Government on the issue of
guilt." 3
Many lower courts have cited Masciale as holding that a jury is
free to disbelieve a defendant's testimony of his entrapment, and
decide that there was no entrapment, even in cases where the prose-
cution has offered no evidence to rebut the defendant's testimony."
Under this interpretation, although the Government has the burden
Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); Enciso v. United
States, 370 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1967); Jordan v. United States, 348 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Orza, 320 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1963); Matysek v. United-States, 321 F.2d 246
(9th Cir. 1963); Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Santore, 270 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1959); Roth v. United States, 270 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1959).
35. 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
36. 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956).
37. 356 U.S. at 388.
38. Id. at 387.
39. ' Id. at 387-88.
40. Id. at 387.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 388.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d'20, 24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1975);
United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1080 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d
242, 244 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of proving no entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, it need not
contradict a defendant's testimony as to the circumstances of the
alleged entrapment. The Townsend court relied upon the Masciale
holding in deciding that the jury could properly find predisposition
in the defendant without the testimony of informer Core. 5
In United States v. Bueno,46 the Fifth Circuit stated that where a
defendant claims entrapment, the sale itself would be sufficient
evidence of the defendant's predisposition to allow submission of
the entrapment issue to the jury: "In such cases where the issue is
willingness or unwillingness of the defendant, the defense becomes
a jury question because the sale itself constitutes evidence of will-
ingness contrary to the defense of unwillingness."47
In United States v. West,4" however, the Third Circuit rejected
the view first put forth in Masciale, and expanded upon in Bueno,
that the Government need not rebut a defendant's testimony of
entrapment. The court undermined Masciale by stating that the
prosecution in that case did contradict the defendant's claim of
entrapment.'" The Third Circuit pointed to the testimony of Agent
Marshall regarding Masciale's boast that he knew someone from
whom Marshall could obtain "88 per cent pure heroin" as rebutting
Masciale's entrapment claim.'
The West court also distinguished Masciale from the facts pre-
sented before it. In West, the defendant was convicted of two counts
of unlawful distribution of heroin and one count of knowing posses-
sion of narcotics with intent to distribute." The prosecution's evi-
dence centered on the testimony of Officer Laguins, who had posed
as an undercover narcotics buyer. He testified that Robert Chieves,
an informer, and Gary West, the defendant, had arranged to sell
45. 555 F.2d at 157-58.
46. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 906. The Government's charges stemmed from two sales of narcotics by David
Bueno to undercover agents. The Bueno court found that the government did not merely
purchase heroin from the defendant but also supplied it to him. Id. As this case was decided
on the issue of government misconduct, the court's statement regarding predisposition is
dictum. For a discussion of the viability of Bueno after United States v. Hampton, 425 U.S.
484 (1976), see United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977).
48. 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 1087.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1084.
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heroin to him on a consignment basis." The facts disclosed that
West and Chieves delivered heroin to Laguins on two occasions.5'
Officers arrested the defendant enroute to the third delivery." La-
guins stated that he had previously arrested Chieves for selling nar-
cotics, and that Chieves had agreed to introduce him to other nar-
cotics sellers.56
Defendant West testified that he and Chieves were old friends,
and that Chieves was aware of his serious need for money.57 The
defendant also stated that Chieves suggested to him that they sell
fake heroin to Laguins, an acquaintance of Chieves.5 West testified
that Chieves offered to obtain the heroin, but requested that defen-
dant West make the sales." Under this arrangement, they would
divide the profits. 0
While reversing the defendant's sale convictions on other grounds,
the Third Circuit stated that it would also have reversed on the
predisposition issue.6 The court decided that the relevant time
frame for determining a defendant's predisposition to sell contra-
band material was prior to the initial solicitation by the informer."
Under this theory of determining predisposition, only the informer's
testimony could be used to rebut a claim of entrapment offered by
a defendant, and the defendant's participation in the subsequent
sale of contraband articles would not be indicative of predisposition.
The West court stated that the government had not satisfied its
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
because it had failed to produce informer Chieves at trial to rebut
the defendant's testimony of entrapment. 3 While the court noted
that the defendant's conduct reflected unfavorably upon his charac-
53. Id. at 1085.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The court stated: "While we view West's case as one of intolerable conduct by govern-
ment agents, one supplying and the other buying the narcotics, the same result is reached if
the entrapment aspect of this case is analyzed as depending solely on the predisposition of
West to engage in illicit drug traffic." Id. at 1086.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1086-87.
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ter, it determined that such conduct could not establish a prior
inclination to engage in the sale of narcotics. 4
The West court asserted that the courts are placing a burden of
persuasion on a defendant rather than a burden of going forward
with the evidence-the current standard-when they allow his unre-
butted testimony to go to the trier of fact for determination.0 To
avoid this consequence, the Third Circuit proposed that once a de-
fendant produced evidence sufficient on its face to prove entrap-
ment, the Government should bear the burden of specifically rebut-
ting the testimony of the accused." The court concluded that this
was not an unreasonable burden, since an informer knows and can
testify to the relevant facts. 7
In Townsend, the issue on appeal was whether the Government
had presented sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy its burden of
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 The de-
fendant's testimony was sufficient to put his claim of entrapment
in issue." Townsend went forward with the evidence by testifying
to informer Core's solicitation of him based upon their prior friend-
ship.7" Although the defendant claimed that Core entrapped him,
neither party called the informer to testify.
The appellate court found that in viewing the evidence "most
favorably to the Government. . . , the jury would find predisposi-
tion on Townsend's part."7' The majority cited the testimony of
Agents Warren and Lukowski, along with the defendant's own ad-
missions, as the basis for this finding.7
The majority noted that the 'defendant had admitted that he was
an "ex-police character" who had been involved with firearms all
of his life. Agent Warren's testimony concerned Townsend's partic-
64. Id. at 1086.
65. Id. at 1087.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 555 F.2d at 155.
69. Id. at 162.(Swygert, J., dissenting).
70. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
71. 555 F.2d at 156. The Townsend court cited Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942), as authority.
72. 555 F.2d at 158.
73. Id. at 156. The majority also pointed out that the defendant had been convicted of
armed robbery and perjury, both of which were reversed due to trial error. Id. at 156 n.5. The
opinion adds that the defendant was arrested with a firearm twice within five years. Id. at
156.
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ipation in the sales. This included the defendant's statement that
he had planned to cut the stock of the first gun down to pistol-grip
size and pour lead into the handle to give it weight and balance.74
Agent Lukowski examined the weapons and testified to their lack
of registration.7" The appellate court found the above testimony to
be sufficiently indicative of the defendant's predisposition to uphold
the conviction.7"
The Townsend court found further indications of the defendant's
predisposition in the allegations summarized by the prosecutor in
his closing arguments.77 The prosecutor pointed out that the defen-
dant was charged with possession of firearms on two different occa-
sions.7" He stated that Townsend had participated in an armed
robbery, was knowledgeable as to firearms, and had been arrested
a number of different times with a firearm.7 He also noted that
the defendant had the first firearm two or three days before selling
it to Warren, and admittedly shared in the proceeds of the sales. 0
Finally, in response to the defendant's charge that the Government
could have called Core as a witness, the prosecutor replied that the
informer was equally available to defense counsel."'
Judge Swygert, in his dissenting opinion, argued that neither the
prosecutor's allegations nor the combined testimony of the agents
and the defendant could establish predisposition on the defendant's
part."2 Judge Swygert asserted that Townsend had no prior record
74. Id.
75. Id. at 154.
76. Id. at 158. The majority also cited defense counsel's statements at trial as conceding
the issue of predisposition. Id. The, defense stated:
You don't leave your common sense outside. You know as well as I do in watching that
man [the defendant] testify and hearing about his background that if Mr. Core
wanted him to keep a tank or a machine gun or if he had an opportunity to get a tank
or a machine gun and make a few bucks, he would do it. Let's lay our cards on the
table.
Id. at 158 n.9.
The dissent replied that those statements were not evidence in the case and could not
therefore satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. Judge Swygert argued that the most such
a statement indicates about the defendant is that he is weak-willed, and does not show
predisposition. Id. at 162 n.3.
77. Id. at 156.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 156 n.6.
82. Id. at 161-62.
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of dealing in firearms. He concluded that there was absolutely no
evidence that Townsend was dealing in illegally adapted guns at the
time of his solicitation by Core, or at any time previously."
Applying the West rationale, Judge Swygert further argued that
the critical time period for determining a defendant's predisposition
is the period before his solicitation. 4 He noted that the transactions
testified to by Agent Warren occurred after the initial solicitation
of the defendant. 5 He asserted that the majority was misplacing the
relevant time period for determining predisposition by considering
the agent's testimony.80 The dissent concluded that, in this case,
only the testimony of informer Core could be used to prove predispo-
sition by the prosecution.87
The majority considered the argument put forth by Judge Swy-
gert, but found that the jury could weigh the demeanor of the defen-
dant on the stand, along with his enthusiasm and depth of involve-
ment in the commission of the crime, in determining whether he was
predisposed to commit the offense. 8 As noted, the majority inter-
preted the Masciale holding to allow a jury to find predisposition in
the defendant solely on their view of his credibility.89 The majority
applied this interpretation to the Townsend facts and held that the
jury's findings were supportable."
Judge Swygert asserted that Masciale was clearly distinguish-
able." He pointed to the agent's testimony in Masciale of the defen-
dant's boast that he could procure "88 per cent pure heroin."9 The
dissent concluded that the testimony of Agent Warren was irrele-
vant because the events testified to occurred after the initial solici-
tation by informer Core;93 that the prosecutor's allegations concern-
83. Id. at 161. In discussing the issue of Townsend's predisposition, the dissent seems to
focus on the defendant's inclination to sell firearms. The charges involving the transfer of the
firearms were dismissed on defendant's pre-trial motion. See note 1 supra.
84. 555 F.2d at 162.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 165.
88. Id. at 157 n.8.
89. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
90. 555 F.2d at 157-58.
91. Id. at 165-66.
92. Id. at 166. The West court also found that this evidence presented by the Govern-
ment indicated predisposition on the part of the defendant. See text accompanying note 50
supra.
93. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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ing Townsend's background were insufficient to establish predispo-
sition;"4 and that because of the Government's failure to rebut
Townsend's testimony, the jury's verdict must be overturned. 5
Upon closer analysis, there seems to be an inconsistency in the
arguments put forth by Judge Swygert. He'dismissed Agent War-
ren's testimony because the events related did not occur in the
relevant time period for determining a defendant's predisposition."
Then he distinguished the Masciale case on the grounds that the
prosecution in that case had rebutted the defendant's testimony 7
whereas the prosecution in Townsend did not.9
Judge Swygert seems to have overlooked the similarities between
the testimony of Agent Marshall in Masciale and Agent Warren in
Townsend. Marshall testified to the defendant's boast that he knew
someone from whom he could obtain "88 per cent pure heroin."99
Warren testified that Townsend stated that he planned to cut the
stock of the first firearm down to pistol-grip size and pour lead into
the handle to give it weight and balance.'"° Both Agent Marshall and
Agent Warren were testifying to statements which occurred after a
defendant's initial solicitation. Yet, Judge Swygert found that Mar-
shall's testimony rebutted the defendant Masciale's claim of en-
trapment, but that the prosecution in Townsend had failed to rebut
the defendant's testimony. Moreover, the dissent dismissed Agent
Warren's testimony completely. 10
Judge Swygert argued that Townsend's enthusiasm in transfer-
ring the firearms was irrelevant to the issue of his predisposition. 2
The defendant's statement, however, not only indicated his enthusi-
asm with regard to the transfer of the firearms, but also his consider-
able experience with firearms in general. Furthermore, it clearly
indicated a willingness to possess and illegally alter the weapons
which were the subject of the indictment. Townsend's admission
can only be viewed as properly evidencing his predisposition to
94. 555 F.2d at 161.
95. Id. at 166.
96. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
99. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
101. 555 F.2d at 162.
102. Id.
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commit the offenses charged.
Although inapplicable to the facts of this case, the courts should
consider the arguments put forth by Judge Swygert and the West
court in deciding other entrapment cases. Evidence of a defendant's
willingness and enthusiasm in carrying out the commission of a
crime is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant was initially
predisposed to commit the offense. Where a defendant admits to the
crime charged, and his sole defense is that of entrapment, evidence
of his participation in the offense, subsequent to the government's
solicitation, should not be admitted at trial to prove predisposition.
However, where this evidence not only reveals the enthusiasm of
a defendant, but also indicates his prior knowledge and experience
in committing the offense charged, then a court may admit the
evidence as indicative of predisposition. A statement made by a
defendant, although occurring after his initial solicitation, may still
expose a predisposition on his part. Certain conduct of a defendant
may indicate a predisposition to commit the offense, while other
conduct will merely show his enthusiasm in assuring its commis-
sion. The courts must draw this distinction to insure that a defen-
dant's claim of entrapment is fairly considered.
Alex Calabrese
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